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THE GUERRILLA STRIKES BACK: 
A COMMENT ON YVONNE CHIU 
– Uwe Steinhoff – 
In a recent article1 Yvonne Chiu ―contends that nonuniformed combat is 
impermissible and its practitioners cannot be accorded full combatant rights under 
the rules of engagement, because of the manner in which this tactic endangers and 
infringes on the rights of genuine noncombatants‖ (44). This formulation, of 
course, suggests that there is a justifiable manner of endangering and infringing 
on the rights of genuine noncombatants. One such justifiable way seems to be to 
kill them or to mutilate them in the course of an attack on legitimate military tar-
gets – for she nowhere complains about so-called ―collateral damage.‖ Thus, she 
must think that actually killing non-combatants in the pursuit of one’s military tac-
tics can be justifiable, while merely making it more likely that civilians are killed by 
the enemy is absolutely prohibited. Since, however, the usual assumption is that 
killing is worse than letting die, this seems to be a very strange position to take.2 In 
the following I will argue that this suspicion is justified: Chiu’s condemnation of 
nonuniformed combat is unwarranted. 
1. WHAT “PARTICIPATION IN THE FIGHTING”? 
Chiu’s argument goes like this: 
[…] when fighters do not wear uniforms, they implicitly force civilians to partici-
pate in the fighting. 
                                                 
1 Chiu [2010]; all page numbers in brackets refer to this article. 
2 Steinhoff [2010a] p. 89. Jeff McMahan (personal communication) agrees with me on this. Yet, he 
adds (explicitly making clear that this would not tilt the balance against the guerrillas, thanks to 
the just mentioned distinction between killing and letting die) that there ―is, however, one general 
difference between the risks that guerrillas create and those that regular combatants create, and 
this is that the guerrillas create additional risks to their own fellow civilians whereas regular com-
batants generally create risks for enemy civilians.‖ But this is not correct since guerrillas fighting in 
foreign territory (this is rare, but it happens) do not typically endanger their own citizens, while 
soldiers fighting in their own territory (which happens constantly) do. See also section (5) below. 
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Because of their similar appearances, a soldier cannot practically distinguish be-
tween his nonuniformed enemy and a civilian. This leads the soldier to view all 
persons as potential combatants—an entirely reasonable and expected response—
even as he continues to pursue only the combatants, albeit with greater care and at 
greater risk to himself. But as a result, civilians are unwillingly drawn into the 
fighting, because they often find themselves in the vicinity of and mistaken for 
nonuniformed combatants. Whether or not they take up arms to defend them-
selves, civilians in this situation are unwittingly forced to become combatants, thus 
compromising the autonomy of those who have chosen to refrain from fighting. 
This involuntary surrender of civilian immunity differs from government con-
scription into military service, because civilians in the former situation are una-
ware of their new status as combatants or their concomitant rights and responsibil-
ities. (55) 
A couple of comments are in order. First of all, leaving aside the question of 
what it means to ―implicitly‖ force a person to do something, the fact of the matter 
is that the fighters do not, by not wearing uniforms, force civilians to participate in 
the fighting (I suspect the qualifier ―implicitly‖ is an implicit concession of this 
fact). To participate in the fighting means more than just to be ―in the vicinity of 
and mistaken for nonuniformed combatants‖ – if it didn’t, the civilians would not 
be mistaken for nonuniformed combatants (Chiu’s choice of words here is reveal-
ing); it means to shoot, to handle weapons, to provide ammunition etc.; it does not 
merely mean to look suspicious or to be shot at or to be killed by enemy forces. 
A lot of babies are killed by enemy forces; that does not, however, make them par-
ticipants in the hostilities. It just makes them victims of the hostilities. 
Hence, second, it is also wrong to claim that ―whether or not they take up 
arms to defend themselves, civilians in this situation are unwittingly forced to be-
come combatants.‖ What sense of ―combatants‖ is used here? In international hu-
manitarian law, a combatant is somebody who has a legal right to take part in the 
armed conflict.3 However, the civilians Chiu is talking about definitely do not 
have such a right under international humanitarian law. So they cannot be comba-
tants in the legal sense. People can of course also be combatants in an everyday 
sense, that is, precisely in the sense that they do take part in the conflict by actually 
shooting etc. But the civilians Chiu mentions are not combatants in this sense ei-
                                                 
3 See Article 43.2 of Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions: ―Members of the armed 
forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of 
the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities.‖ 
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ther (otherwise the whole problem would not even arise). Thus, if Chiu insists on 
describing them as combatants anyways, she is guilty of false labeling. 
Third, Chiu’s claim that the civilians in this situation involuntarily surrender 
their immunity4 is wrong if it is to be understood as a claim about international 
humanitarian law.5 They most definitely remain immune. This is just the logical 
consequence of their not becoming combatants in either the legal or the colloquial 
sense of the term. 
The claim is also wrong as a moral one. People do not lose their right not to 
be killed only because others are unable to tell them from threats. If the police of-
ficer shoots an innocent person because he mistook the person’s cell phone for 
a gun, then the officer has certainly violated the right of the innocent person – 
whether excusably or not. Besides, if Chiu in all seriousness thinks that the civi-
lians she is talking about have lost their immunity from attack merely due to the 
fact that others cannot tell them from real combatants, namely from the guerilla 
fighters, then it is not clear why the soldier should continue ―to pursue only the 
combatants, albeit with greater care and at greater risk to himself.‖ After all, ac-
cording to her logic everybody in the situation is now a combatant (which, inciden-
tally, makes her statements inconsistent); and if the ―involuntary combatants‖ no 
longer have immunity, then the soldier is obviously free to kill them. However, 
this would make Chiu’s position virtually and uncomfortably indistinguishable 
from that of the ―Christian‖ theologian Paul Ramsey, who advanced a similar ar-
gument to give American soldiers in Vietnam carte blanche to mow down and 
carpet bomb civilians in ―guerrilla territory.‖6 
I also do not see how such a view concerning the ―involuntary surrender of 
civilian immunity‖ squares with Chiu’s proclamation that ―the right to civilian 
immunity can only be surrendered by becoming a soldier under very limited cir-
cumstances that preclude nonuniformed combat‖ (50) or with a statement like 
this: ―The right to not be attacked is forfeited through an intentional exchange. It is 
                                                 
4 This remark of hers is not a mere lapse. She repeats it several times, also notably in the summary 
of her argument: ―Nonuniformed combat morally infringes on civilians’ rights by forcing them to 
participate in the fighting and thus unwillingly give up fundamental rights to immunity.‖ (44) 
5 Chiu (personal communication) states, however, that she did not want to make a claim about 
international law here. 
6 See Ramsey [2002], esp. Ch. 18. I have criticized Ramsey’s views in Steinhoff [2010a] p. 84-97. If 
Chiu really wants to maintain the position I just objected to, my criticism of Ramsey applies to her 
too. 
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the only way a civilian can give up his immunity [...].‖ (52) Again she contradicts 
herself.7 
Thus, the assumptions on which Chiu’s argument relies – and therefore the 
argument itself – are mistaken. 
2. WHAT “CONSCRIPTION”? 
Connected with her inappropriate and misleading use of the term ―partici-
pation in the fighting‖ is Chiu’s inappropriate and misleading use of the term 
―conscription.‖ She claims: 
The coercion of civilians exacted by nonuniformed combat differs substantively 
from conscription, and is not acceptable as a lesser form of conscription. [...] This 
form of unofficial conscription fails to meet standards of transparency, one of the 
requirements of a well-ordered society, because the conscripted civilians are una-
ware of what has happened to them. (44) 
Thus, this ―unofficial conscription‖ differs from conscription (why, then, call it 
―conscription‖ in the first place?); yet, she nevertheless claims the civilians are ―es-
sentially conscripted‖ (56) due to the fact that the guerilla forces do not wear uni-
forms and therefore make it more likely for the civilians to be killed by the enemy. 
However, the fact of the matter is that this is not conscription at all, and therefore 
one should not call it such. 
Imagine, for example, that the guerillas in some region in Indonesia have 
perfected a tactic where they very convincingly disguise themselves as orangu-
tans. Therefore, on Chiu’s logic, because ―of their similar appearances, a soldier 
cannot practically distinguish between his nonuniformed enemy and a [orangu-
tan]‖ (55). Indeed, uniformed combatants, ―even if they try to continue treating 
[orangutans] with special care, will be forced to assume that [orangutans] might 
be nonuniformed enemy combatants and start treating them as such.‖8 (56) Have 
                                                 
7 McMahan (personal communication) has pointed out to me that Chiu seems to use the term ―im-
munity‖ in two senses, one factual and one normative. In the normative sense, immunity means 
the right not to be targeted; in the factual sense it means actually not being targeted. Clearly, in the 
second quote in this paragraph she uses it in the second sense, and in the third quote in the first 
sense. However, this does not undermine my claim that she contradicts herself: it is quite obvious 
that in the first quote she uses ―immunity‖ in the first sense (and McMahan agrees that this is the 
―natural reading‖) – otherwise her argument about ―surrendering rights‖ would not even get off 
the ground. Moreover, she also explicitly says, as already quoted, that nonuniformed combat ―mo-
rally infringes on civilians’ rights by forcing them to participate in the fighting and thus unwilling-
ly give up fundamental rights to immunity.‖ (44) The second quote and this quote definitely do 
contradict each other. 
8 Obviously, I have substituted ―orangutans‖ for ―civilians‖ here. 
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the orangutans now been conscripted? Of course not. According to Merriam-
Webster, conscription is ―compulsory enrollment of persons especially for military 
service‖ – but service is an activity. Being shot at is not; it is a ―passivity.‖ Just as 
babies and civilians do not become combatants just because someone shoots at 
them, babies, civilians and orangutans are also not conscripted by someone merely 
making it more likely that they are shot at. They do not serve in the military or mi-
litia. 
A final note on this issue: Let us assume for a second that Chiu is right in 
claiming that the civilians are ―essentially conscripted‖ – why are they ―unaware 
of what has happened‖ to them? Chiu seems to think that the nonuniformed figh-
ters themselves are perfectly aware of what is happening to the civilians; indeed, 
she seems to think they make it happen on purpose. So why do the civilians them-
selves not notice it? It will, after all, hardly escape their attention that they are of-
ten shot at by the enemy. Maybe all she means is that the guerrillas will not point 
out to the civilians what will happen to them due to the adoption of guerrilla tac-
tics.9 But first, pointing that out will hardly be necessary (since it is obvious); 
second, they might point it out; and third, soldiers usually also do not point out to 
enemy civilians or to their own civilians, for that matter (see section 5), what will 
happen to them as a consequence of the soldiers’ warfare. Thus, Chiu’s claim 
about the lack of ―transparency‖ is either wrong or irrelevant. 
3. WHAT “COERCION”? 
As we just saw, Chiu thinks that the civilians are ―coerced.‖ That is some-
what astonishing, since in trying to refute a counter-argument to her position she 
also writes: 
In the situation at hand, the ability of a state to conscript officially (in the strong 
sense) does not inevitably make it acceptable for the state to conscript unofficially 
(in the weak sense) by having its soldiers not wear uniforms. 
To understand this, killing and coercion must be distinguished. Barbara 
Herman writes: 
Although many violent acts are coercive […], it will not do to claim that killing is 
a limiting case of coercion. A coercive act aims at the control of a person’s will; kill-
ing does not (at least not of the will of the person killed). In killing, someone is 
prevented from doing anything at all, but he is not made to do something against 
                                                 
9 This has been suggested to me by McMahan (personal communication). 
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his will. There is a significant difference between threatening pain or twisting your 
arm (or even threatening to kill) to keep you from joining the opposition party and 
killing you to achieve the same result. The coercive act looks to alter what will 
happen by controlling what an agent wills. In killing, the victim is not prevented 
from doing something—the killing prevents something from happening. Killing 
(and noncoercive violence in general) poses a moral problem that needs to be kept 
separate from that of coercion. (71)10 
Obviously, however, the nonuniformed guerillas do not alter the will of the 
civilians at all. They do not twist the arms of the civilians to make them more will-
ing to be shot at. They do not tell them: ―Either you draw the fire on you, or we 
will kill you.‖ All they do is to make it more likely that the civilians are shot at – 
this involves no acting upon the will. Official conscription, however, does: ―Either 
you serve in the military or we will send you to jail.‖ Thus, Chiu gets it wrong. If 
she is against coercion, she should object to official conscription and congratulate 
the guerillas for their respect for human autonomy.11 
It is true, of course, that the guerilla might act against the will of the civilians 
by not wearing uniforms – but, first, this is not coercion, and second, the counter-
insurgents definitely act against the will of the civilians by actually killing them. 
Thus, shouldn’t Chiu be criticizing them instead? 
4. FIAT JUSTITIA, PEREAT MUNDUS? 
Chiu’s conclusion is: ―Not wearing a uniform or its equivalent in prepara-
tion for or during combat should always be illegal, with no exceptions for exte-
nuating circumstances.‖ (75) This conclusion about the appropriate law seems to 
be based on her moral judgment that ―nonuniformed combat is morally unaccept-
able.‖ (77) 
However, even if her argument so far had been correct – which, as we saw, 
is not the case – it would not support her conclusion. After all, as she herself 
summarizes her argument, she ―has argued that nonuniformed combatants in-
fringe on the rights of civilians by forcing them into a moral position that they did 
not choose or accept.‖ (64) Yet, she realizes: ―Obviously, infringement on one’s 
                                                 
10 Chiu quotes here Herman [1993], p. 119. 
11 As an aside: Chiu’s view that coercion ―is worse than simply killing the agent‖ (72) defies law 
and common sense. For Herman, as we just saw, threatening to kill a person if he or she does not 
do a certain thing is coercion. Thus, if this were really worse than killing the person right away, 
police officers should not first threaten an armed criminal by saying, ―Drop your gun or we will 
open fire!,‖ but without further ado blow his brains out right away – out of exuberant respect for 
his autonomy, of course. 
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moral standing is permissible in some cases, such as killings in self-defense against 
innocent attackers.‖12 (64) 
In trying to answer to this objection, she refers to a position taken by Chris-
topher Kutz, who places much emphasis on the importance of ―political units,‖13 
and she claims: ―Giving nonuniformed combatants the full benefits of uniformed 
combatants, even provided that they meet a particular threshold of political for-
mation, says in effect that collective goods take precedence.‖ (66) 
But, of course, guerrillas can defend not just ―collective goods‖ such as na-
tional or ethnic self-determination, but also the freedom, the physical integrity and the 
lives of individuals, a fact Chiu never considers. Consider this situation: A maniacal 
dictator sends his uniformed soldiers into the jungle in order to exterminate all 
members of the Eloy there, a very nice ethnic group. If the guerrillas lose, all civi-
lians will be killed anyway. The guerrillas can, however, heighten their chances of 
repelling the uniformed genocidal forces by engaging in non-uniformed combat, 
so that it is not that easy for the génocidaires to first neutralize the armed resistance 
in order to then commit the genocide ―in peace.‖ With regard to this situation it is, 
I submit, quite simply and obviously absurd to claim, as Chiu does (and, in par-
ticular, to sell that claim as stemming from a concern for the safety of the civi-
lians), that the guerrillas are not justified in engaging in non-uniformed combat.14 
It is also absurd to claim, as Chiu does (73-5), that the civilians themselves are not 
entitled to consent to the guerillas’ not wearing uniforms. 
                                                 
12 In a footnote pertaining to the sentence just quoted, she mentions McMahan [1994]. However, 
McMahan argues in that article that killing an innocent aggressor is not justified. Chiu is also mis-
taken in claiming that ―the conclusion is generally accepted—killing B in self-defense, innocence 
notwithstanding, infringes on B’s rights, but the action is both regrettable and permissible.‖ (64) 
Actually, the majority position – which is also accepted in virtually all Western jurisdictions – is 
that harming an innocent aggressor in proportionate and necessary self-defense does not infringe 
on his rights. In the philosophical literature this position has been paradigmatically stated by Ju-
dith Jarvis Thomson [1991]. For an attempt to improve on Thomson’s explanation on why the in-
nocent aggressor may be killed, see Steinhoff [2007] p. 81-89. My explanation implies – contrary to 
Thomson’s – that the innocent attacker may defend himself against the justified defense of his po-
tential victim. Thus, we have a symmetrical defense situation here. 
13 See Kutz [2005]. 
14 The obviousness of this absurdity also suffices as objection to Chiu’s attempt to enlist Rawls for 
her purposes (73-75). Quite frankly, I find her discussion of what Rawls’s non-ideal theory might 
or might not imply for the case at issue both irrelevant and arbitrary. Besides, Rawls has not devel-
oped any non-ideal theory. He has just offered, as an afterthought to his ideal theory, a lot of stipula-
tions about non-ideal circumstances. The reason for this is that his ideal theory implies, pace 
A.J. Simmons, pretty much nothing useful about non-ideal circumstances. For more on this see 
Steinhoff [2011]. 
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Moreover, in this situation it is not even clear that the guerillas actually do 
infringe upon the rights of the civilians. An idea of Jeff McMahan’s might help to 
make this clearer: 
Suppose that at the time a decision has to be made about whether to fight a war in 
defense of a group of noncombatants, all those noncombatants are expected bene-
ficiaries of the war, even if the war will be fought in a way that will expose them to 
new risks. They all have reason, at that time, to want the war to be fought. Yet they 
know that the strategy will later require acts that will convert some of them from 
expected beneficiaries into expected or actual victims. They also know that if it 
were a constraint on the implementation of the strategy that no individual act of 
war could be done unless all those noncombatants it would expose to risk would 
be expected beneficiaries of it, it would be impossible to implement the strategy. 
They therefore know that if their luck is bad, they will have no right to expect the 
strategy to be abandoned. The strategy can be justified in this way even to those 
who turn out to be its actual victims. And this explains why what is relevant to the 
justification of the strategy is whether those whom it will expose to risk are ex-
pected beneficiaries when it is adopted, rather than later during its implementa-
tion.15 
Or, in a nutshell: 
In just wars of humanitarian intervention, it is not unfair for just combatants to act 
in certain ways that impose some of the risks and burdens of their action on its ex-
pected civilian beneficiaries.16 
There is no reason to suppose that this is different in guerrilla wars fought 
against a genocidal campaign. Moreover, it very well might still not be different 
when something less than survival is at stake. Chiu herself raises the following 
point: 
What about cases in which civilians implicitly or explicitly consent to rebel use of 
nonuniformed combat—that is, they willingly forfeit their rights to immunity 
without taking on combatant privileges? This might happen if they feel their lives 
are currently so oppressive and worthless that they are willing to accept the dan-
gers and heavy casualties to themselves from nonuniformed combat in the hopes 
that it will secure them better lives in the long run. 
                                                 
15 McMahan [2010] p. 363. 
16 Ibidem, p. 370. 
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When civilians forfeit their immunity, however, they automatically become com-
batants and, in this case, nonuniformed ones. With immunity comes responsibility, 
not just privilege. By agreeing to be put into harm’s way as a civilian decoy with 
an understanding of the battlefield effects (increased difficulty for opponents in 
telling civilians and soldiers apart), these individuals are reneging on their respon-
sibilities to refrain from influencing the battle’s outcome; so even if they surrender 
their privilege to kill enemy soldiers, they are no longer civilians. (73) 
Indeed, giving the oppressive situation they are living in, the civilians 
might consent to risk their lives in order to escape their situation. How the second 
paragraph of this quote is to refute this argument, however, is unclear. First of all, 
under international law civilians cannot simply forfeit immunity by saying that 
they want to waive their immunity. Of course, they can take up arms and thereby 
would forfeit their immunity, but this is precisely what they are, ex hypothesi, not 
doing here. Thus, international humanitarian law is not applicable to this situation 
of waiving one’s rights and hence Chiu must be referring to the moral rights of (in-
nocent) civilians. 
But then it has to be said that Chiu is not doing any more here than making 
an entirely unsubstantiated claim. The right of the civilians that the guerrillas do 
not fight without wearing uniforms is, I suppose, meant to be a claim-right the 
civilians hold against the guerrillas (if it is not supposed to be that, I do not know 
what it is). So they waive this right by telling them: ―It is ok, we do not insist on 
our rights that you do not wear uniforms, go ahead and fight without uniforms.‖ 
But this certainly does not imply, contrary to Chiu’s suggestion, that then they 
also lose their right not to be killed or attacked by third parties. In other words, it 
does not imply that they lose or waive their immunity. Besides, it is not even true 
that by losing one’s immunity one ―automatically‖ becomes a combatant. It is flat-
ly wrong, notably, under international humanitarian law (a civilian who takes up 
arms, even in self-defense, thereby loses his immunity, but he does not become 
a combatant in the legal sense, for he does not acquire the right to fight17) and ob-
viously wrong in the colloquial sense of ―combatant‖ too. (As an aside: I am not 
aware of any clause in international humanitarian law that obliges civilians ―to 
refrain from influencing the battle’s outcome.‖ International humanitarian law 
only obliges them to refrain from influencing the battle’s outcome by taking up 
arms. Nor are civilians under a moral obligation not to influence the battle’s out-
                                                 
17 See Detter [2003] p. 140. 
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come – for example by shouting, ―They are coming,‖ thereby foiling the genocidal 
enemy’s surprise attack.) 
More important still, let us suppose that the civilians would really all be-
come combatants by consenting to the guerrillas’ not wearing uniforms. The ques-
tion then arises: So what? They are now all ―combatants,‖ they all have lost im-
munity, and they now can be shot at. So there are no civilians left whose rights 
they are infringing upon. Chiu’s argument then does not even get off the ground. 
But what, one might object, if there are still some civilians who have not 
waived their rights that the guerillas do not fight without uniform? Wouldn’t their 
rights be infringed by those civilians who did waive those rights? The answer is 
a resounding ―No.‖ If they have a right that the guerillas do not fight without uni-
form, then this right is for obvious logical and conceptual reasons not infringed 
upon by the other civilians’ waiving certain rights. It is only infringed upon by the 
guerrillas fighting without wearing a uniform. 
This brings us back to the question: can such an infringement be justified? 
Of course it can (and, to remind the reader, at the moment I am only assuming 
that it is a rights infringement for the sake of argument). Consider an analogous 
situation. Innocent people have a right not to be punished. However, there is no 
penal system that would not produce judicial errors. Thus, the implementation of 
a penal system has the known side-effect of endangering innocent people. How-
ever, the judicial system, if it is a good one, will on the whole make the lives of those 
subjected to it safer and freer (although there are some innocent people whose 
lives it will make miserable and who would have been better off without it). (This 
argument follows the logic of the one provided by McMahan above.) Suppose, 
now, that some citizens do not waive their rights not to be innocently punished 
and do not consent to the implementation of a penal system. Does this make the 
implementation of a penal system unjustified? Intuitively, it clearly does not. In-
deed, the objection (by innocent people) to a penal system that does ex ante heigh-
ten the chances of innocent people leading a safer and freer life seems to be quite 
simply irrational. However, if someone did insist on his irrational objection to the 
implementation of such a penal system, and if he did have a right not to be en-
dangered by a penal system he objects to, then all this would intuitively suggest is 
that under such circumstances his right could be justifiably infringed. After all, it 
is simply unacceptable and unfair for a small group of people to block measures 
that are ex ante good for the whole population only because there is a risk that they 
themselves (a risk everybody else shares) might actually not benefit. Whoever dis-
agrees would also have to declare public transportation absolutely prohibited: af-
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ter all, some people who have not waived their right of not being endangered by 
buses might actually get hit by them. 
Thus, even if Chiu had established (which she hasn’t) that civilians have 
a right that guerillas do not endanger them by not wearing uniforms, this would 
not be sufficient to show that guerillas are morally absolutely prohibited from not 
wearing uniforms. Insisting on such a prohibition in the genocide case, for exam-
ple, seems to defeat the purpose – instead of protecting civilians, it only gets them 
killed. But even with regard to defense against ―mere‖ oppression, an absolute 
prohibition on nonuniformed combat does not always protect the interests of civi-
lians, but instead often harms them. 
5. CHIU’S BLIND SPOT: “COLLATERAL DAMAGE” 
In any case, there is no general right of innocent people not to be endan-
gered anyway. You do not violate or infringe upon pedestrians’ rights by driving 
a car although you certainly endanger them thereby. There is, however, a general 
right of innocent people not to be killed. This is a right that the counter-insurgency 
forces violate by killing innocent civilians, whether ―collaterally‖ or not. 
It is disconcerting that Chiu has nothing to say about ―collateral damage.‖ 
Let us recall the essence of her argument again: ―This article has argued that non- 
-uniformed combatants infringe on the rights of civilians by forcing them into 
a moral position that they did not choose or accept.‖ (64) I have pointed out that 
this ―moral position,‖ on her account, is their loss of immunity; and I have also 
pointed out that the civilians do not lose their immunity in the way Chiu describes 
– in fact, her description of this loss contradicts certain statements of her own. 
However, let me now describe a way that you can indeed force civilians in-
to a moral position they did not choose or accept. There is a war going on, and 
General Bigshot plays a very important role in it, so important, in fact, that an at-
tack that would also kill 100 innocent bystanders alongside him would still be 
proportionate and justified. Bigshot goes through the city. By doing so he forces all 
the civilian passersby into a moral position they did not choose or accept: they are 
now, due to his presence, to which they did not consent, justifiably ―killable.‖18 
Indeed, when President Bigmouth declared the war , Bigshot was just reading (in 
uniform) in his favorite diner in the desert, with not more than 100 people present. 
Thus, Bigmouth forced the 100 people in the diner into a moral position they did 
not consent to. Tank division A drives by the houses of some civilians, Regiment B 
gets provisions in a village, Battalion C looks for cover in a forest that civilians use 
                                                 
18 Justifiably, not justly! See Steinhoff [2007] p. 50-51, 57-58. 
Uwe Steinhoff ◦ The Guerrilla Strikes Back: A Comment on Yvonne Chiu 
 72 
to search for wood and mushrooms etc. – all these military units force civilians 
into a moral position they did not choose or accept: they make their lives disposa-
ble in the course of a justified military attack on these units. 
Modern war cannot be waged without forcing some (indeed large numbers 
of) civilians into a moral position they did not choose or accept – there will always 
be ―collateral damage,‖ and some of it will be, would be or would have been justi-
fied. Thus, unless Chiu embraces contingent pacifism (which she clearly doesn’t), 
her pointing the finger at the nonuniformed guerillas but not the uniformed sol-
diers and the politicians declaring war reveals a double standard. She cannot con-
sistently deem it morally acceptable that uniformed soldiers make many civilians 
non-immune to being killed while condemning nonuniformed combatants for 
doing exactly the same. 
6. PRO-STATE BIAS 
What I referred to as to the ―blind spot‖ and the double standard in Chiu’s 
argument is, in my view, at least partly attributable to her unabashed pro-state 
bias. Therefore, it is useful to have a closer look at what she has to say about the 
special role of the state. The most revealing passage in her article in this regard is 
the following, which merits being quoted at length: 
[…] only through the constitution of a political state can soldiers derive the right to 
legitimately kill each other as representatives of their states, rather than as indi-
vidual, criminal murderers. Political entities have a mediating role in warfare, 
meaning that the state can allow its citizens to legitimately perform acts that 
would otherwise be disallowed under domestic governance, notably, engage in 
war and kill other people. It does not, however, trump all other goods. Someone 
who is not a recognized citizen of a state or other governing body is in a state of 
nature with respect to other individuals in the world. This has ramifications for 
what duties others owe to him. For example, stateless individuals or citizens who 
fight outside the authority of their state’s recognized military could not possess the 
right to kill soldiers, or the right to be treated in accordance with established inter-
national military conventions for POWs. The government may very well choose to 
treat such a person like other soldiers anyway, but for reasons other than duties 
imposed by this battlefield exchange —for example, promoting pragmatic self-
interest, fostering good public relations, straightforward compassion, or recogni-
tion of his personhood. (67) 
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Chiu means ―legitimate‖ as ―morally legitimate‖ here and ―rights‖ as 
―moral rights.‖19 However, that makes her averments truly remarkable. First, if 
my mother allows me to kill an innocent person and promises me not to punish 
me under motherly governance if I do, then that still does not give me the moral 
right to kill the innocent person. Indeed, even if the mother of the innocent person 
told me that she, too, would not punish me for killing her son or daughter, this 
would also not confer on me the moral right to kill that innocent person. States are 
in this respect not better off than mothers – unlike, perhaps, gods, they cannot just 
make the rights of innocent persons disappear by decree. If Chiu – implausibly – 
thinks otherwise, she would at least have to adduce an argument for her position, 
which she does not.20 
Second, it is inconsistent to claim that stateless individuals are ―in a state of 
nature with respect to other individuals in the world‖ and to simultaneously say 
that those stateless individuals may not kill soldiers who unjustly pursue them. If 
they are in the state of nature, by definition they have such a right (indeed, in the 
state of nature every individual has a right to wage war – after all, in social contract 
theory states can only have rights that individuals have transferred to them21). 
Third, if her claim that ―citizens who fight outside the authority of their state’s 
recognized military could not possess […] the right to be treated in accordance 
with established international military conventions for POWs‖ is supposed to be a 
claim about international humanitarian law, it is wrong. Of course guerrilla figh-
ters fighting against the recognized forces of their state can have protection as 
POWs, in particular if this conflict is recognized as an ―internationalized‖ one.22 If 
it is supposed to be a moral claim, one suggesting that they ought not get such pro-
tection, then it is hardly more plausible than her idea that states can simply dis-
solve the rights of innocent persons not to be killed. 
States do not have the magical moral powers Chiu seems to ascribe to them; 
and state soldiers do not occupy the moral high ground relative to non-state 
                                                 
19 Chiu has confirmed this to me in a personal communication. 
20 Chiu states (personal communication) that she agrees that the state is not a god, but that it is not 
your mother either. Indeed. However, if even our mothers, who have normally done much more 
for us than our states and whom we hold much dearer, cannot sign away our rights or our duties 
to other people, Chiu would have to explain why she thinks, as she appears to do, that states can. 
Again, she does not offer such an explanation. Incidentally, there are some points of contact be-
tween Chiu’s view of the state and the role Yitzhak Benbaji accords to it in the context of war and 
―the war convention.‖ See Benbaji [2008; 2009]. For a criticism of Benbaji’s position that to a large 
extent might also apply to Chiu’s, see Steinhoff [2010b].  
21 See Steinhoff [2007] p. 18-20. 
22 See Detter [2003] p. 141-148. 
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groups. Her pro-state and anti-rebel bias is misplaced and not backed up by any 
argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Chiu does not manage to show that nonuniformed combat is morally abso-
lutely prohibited. Her argument that by fighting without uniforms nonuniformed 
guerrillas coerce civilians into participating in the armed conflict and thus into 
surrendering their immunity (their right not to be attacked) fails: there is no coer-
cion, there is no participation, and there is no surrendering of immunity. Even if, 
however, this argument of hers were correct so far, it would still not show that 
such ―coercion‖ would amount to a rights infringement. Moreover, even if it did 
amount to such a rights infringement, there are examples that clearly show that 
such an infringement, if it exists at all, is sometimes perfectly justified. Finally, if 
she were right (which she is not) that forcing civilians into a moral position that 
they have not accepted or chosen is absolutely wrong, she would have to embrace 
pacifism, for uniformed soldiers also routinely force civilians into a position they 
have not accepted or chosen, namely by making it justifiable to kill them ―collate-
rally‖ in the course of an attack on a legitimate military target. She does not em-
brace pacifism, however. Thus, her stern criticism of nonuniformed guerrillas does 
not cohere with her lenient attitude towards soldiers.23 
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